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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-CALIFORNIA'S GUEST STATUTE DOES NOT
APPLY TO ACCIDENTS WHICH OCCUR OFF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS.
O'Donnell v. Mullaney (Cal. 1967).
On July 20, 1963, the deceased, Peggy O'Donnell and the defen-
dant, William Francis Mullaney, both 18 years of age, attended a
picnic in Orange County, California. Late in the afternoon Mr.
Mullaney invited Miss O'Donnell for a ride in his sports car. She
accepted the invitation, which was entirely social in nature, with no
tangible benefits or monetary consideration involved. From the picnic
site the defendant drove onto a public highway, and after proceeding
for a distance slightly in excess of one mile, he turned onto a private
road, known only as "Mobil Oil Lease Road." The road was narrow
and winding, running through the foothills in the vicinity. After
driving approximately one-half mile on the private road, the defen-
dant came to a sharp curve which he was unable to negotiate. His
car left the road and plummeted several hundred feet down the
side of a cliff, inflicting fatal injuries upon the deceased. The trial
court rendered judgment for the defendant, holding the California
guest statute applicable as a matter of law. The trial court's judgment
was affirmed on appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. On
appeal to the California Supreme Court held, reversed: The Califor-
nia guest statute is not applicable to accidents occurring off public
highways. O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Adv. Cal. 1048, 449 P.2d 160,
59 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1967).
The sole issue presented on appeal enabled the Supreme Court to
decide for the first time whether the California guest statute is ap-
plicable to an accident on a private roadway as distinguished from
a public highway.
Initially adopted in 1929, the guest statute' was codified in 1935 as
Section 403 of the California Vehicle Code.2 As it exists in California
today it provides in part that:
1 Act of June 13, 1929, ch. 787, § 14Y [19291 Cal. Stats. 1580.
Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving upon
any of the public highways of the State of California, and while so riding as
such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have no right of recovery against
the owner or driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle...
(emphasis added).
In 1931 the act was amended but that amendment, for our purposes here, was irrelevant.
Basically, however, the amendment deleted gross negligence as basis for liability, there-
fore making it necessary for the guest to establish either intoxication or willful miscon-
duct on the part of the owner or driver. Act of June 12, 1931, ch. 812, [1931) Cal.
Stats. 1693.
2 Act of March 25, 1935, ch. 27, § 403, [1935] Cal. Stats. 154.
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No person.., who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a
highway without giving compensation for such ride . . . has any
right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle
3
In codifying the 1929 statute the legislature substituted the phrase
"upon a highway" for "upon any of the public highways."
Speaking for the court in O'Donnell, Justice Peters reasoned that
although the word public was deleted in the 1935 codification this did
not enlarge the statute's operation to encompass accidents occurring
off of public roads. Since the word "highway" is defined expressly in
the code as meaning a "public" highway,4 the use of that word in the
California guest statute to define that place where the statute is
operative leads to the inescapable conclusion that the statute is in-
applicable to an occurrence off public roads.5
The court asserted that in order for the defendant to avail himself
of the guest statute, he must show: "(1) that the plaintiff accepted a
'ride' as a guest, (2) that the ride was 'in' a vehicle upon a highway,
and (3) that death or injury was suffered by the guest 'during such
ride.' "6 Inasmuch as the ride was on a corporation's privately main-
tained road and therefore not upon a highway, one of the elements
essential to the statute's operation was absent. Consequently, the
defendant was not protected by the statute.
Pervading the problem is the well-established policy of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court to strictly construe statutes in derogation of the
common law.7 The court was confronted with this strong judicial
policy of strict statutory construction and this supplied the catalyst
for its precise action.
3 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1960), as amended, (Supp. 1966) (empha-
sis added) [hereafter referred to as statute].
4 "'Highway' is a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open
to the use of the public for the purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street.'"
CAL. VmICLE CODE § 360 (West 1960).
5 O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Adv. Cal. 1048, 1051, 449 P.2d 160, 161, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 840, 842 (1967). "Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the term 'highway'
in section 17158 must be interpreted to mean a public roadway and does not include
private roadways."
6 Id. at 1051, 449 P.2d at 162, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (emphasis added).
7 Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 93, 98 P.2d 729, 731 (1940). "The common law
right of having redress for injuries wrongfully inflicted, being lessened by such statutes,
necessitates strict construction, and also that cases be not held within the provisions
of such statutes unless it clearly appears that it should be so determined." McCann v.
Hoffman, 9 Cal. 2d 279, 282, 70 P.2d 909, 911 (1937); Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal. App.
2d 43, 48-49, 127 P.2d 292, 295-96 (1942); Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245,
254, 44 P.2d 478, 483 (1935).
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Absent a controlling statute, the driver of a motor vehicle has a
duty to exercise ordinary, reasonable care to avoid injuries to his
guests.8 The claims of frequent collusion between the driver and the
guest in a suit against the driver's insurer, and the resultant sky-
rocketing automobile insurance premiums has led to the adoption of
guest statutes9 in twenty-six states limiting the driver's liability.10
These statutes limit a guest's cause of action for injuries sustained in
an automobile accident, to certain types of conduct, such as intoxica-
tion, gross negligence, and willful misconduct on the part of indi-
viduals specified in the various statutes.1 The issue of a guest
statute's application to an accident occurring on private property has
been adjudicated in only four other jurisdictions. 2 Three of these
four courts have found nothing in the applicable statutes which would
restrict the operation of the statute to "public" highways.
In Fishback v. Yale,'3 the fact that the defendant was operating
8 See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (3d ed. 1964).
9 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 83 (3d ed. 1964).
The automobile guest statutes ... which are largely the work of insurance
companies in the legislatures, have tended to cut down on liability to guests;
and where there are no such statutes, a clause in the policy may do so.
Id.
10 ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-913 (1959); CAL.
VEHMCLE CODE § 17158 (West 1960);CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1964); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (1953); FLA. STAT. F.S.A. § 320.59 (1955); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 49-1001 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 9-201 (1955); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 47-1021 (1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-122(b) (Corrick, 1949); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 256.29 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 332-1113 (1954); N1EB.
REV. STAT. § 39-740(1) (1952); NEv. Rv. STAT. § 41.180 (1958); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-24-1 (1960); N.D. REv. CODE § 39-15 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 45,
§ 4515.02 (1953); OE. REV. STAT. § 30.115 (1953); S.C. CODE tit. 46, § 801 (1962);
S.D. CODE § 44.0362 (1939); TEX CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 6701b (Supp. 1966);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-9-1 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1491 (1947); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1957); WASH. REv. CODE § 46-08.080; WYo. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1201 (1945).
31 See 96 A.L.R. 1479 (1935).
12 See Fishback v. Yale, 85 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1955). The plaintiff and defendant
had entered upon the land of one A. A. Fiezel in order to gain access to a game
preserve. While standing in front of defendant's auto unlocking a gate, plaintiff was
struck by defendant's auto. Hall v. Bardol, 260 App. Div. 982, 23 N.Y.S.2d 596,
aff'd., 285 N.Y.S. 726, 34 N.E.2d 895 (1940) (where defendant had been driving
with his guest when, in order to avoid a car ahead, he skidded off the road and onto
private property, where the car traveled 100 feet or more before overturning and in-
juring plaintiff); Kitchens v. Duffield, 149 Ohio St. 500, 37 Ohio OPS 200, 79
N.E.2d 906 (1948) (where plaintiff was riding as defendant's guest on a United
States air base, the court pointing out that the guest statute was not limited in its
operation to motor vehicles on public roads or highways); Hayes v. Bower, 39 Wash.
2d 372, 235 P.2d 482 (1951) (where the court explained, in answer to defendant's
contention, that although defendant had entered plaintiff's auto on private property,
the guest statute arose then and was not changed when the car was driven onto a public
way).
18 85 So. 2d at 142-43.
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his automobile on private property did not serve to remove him from
the operation of the statute. In that case, the court was presented with
much the same problem as was the court in O'Donnell, since the term
"motor vehicle" as used in the Florida guest statute14 is defined as
follows:
"Motor Vehicle" includes automobiles, motorcycles, motor trucks
and all other vehicles operated over the public highways and streets
of this state .... 15
The court postulated that to limit the applicability of the statute
to public roadways would lead to many absurd situations in which
the driver's liability would vary according to whether he left the road
for a brief moment. To use the courts illustration:
[I]f the owner of an automobile, while operating it on a public
highway with two guests A and B, should find the highway blocked
or washed out, making it necessary to leave the highway and detour
a hundred yards over private property and while making such detour
guest A was injured by the simple negligence of such owner guest
A would have a cause of action for simple negligence, but if the
host was before leaving the highway onto such detour or imme-
diately upon returning onto the highway guilty of simple negligence
and thereby guest B was injured, guest B would have no cause of
action against such operator. We are unable to agree that the legis-
lature in the enactment of our guest statute intended to limit or
restrict its application in such a manner as to create situations such
as above illustrated, or that it is so limited or restricted... 16
The Supreme Court of Ohio in Kitchens v. Duffield,17 held that
state's guest statute applicable to accidents occurring on private ways,
thus barring recovery for ordinary negligence in the operation of an
automobile on a United States military facility. The Kitchens decision
is unique in that the Ohio statute,18 of the four judicially interpreted,
is the only one which is silent on the problem of public versus private
ways. The court observed:
The General Assembly has not seen fit o limit it in terms to the
operation of motor vehicles on public roads or highways, and, if this
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.59(1) (1955).
15 Id. (emphasis added).
10 85 So. 2d at 146.
17 149 Ohio St. 500, 37 Ohio OPS 200, 79 N.E.2d 906.
18 OHio REV. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 4515.02 (1953).
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor
vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or
death of a guest, resulting from the operation of said motor vehicle, while
such guest is being transported without payment therefor in or upon said
motor vehicle, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton
misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation
of said motor vehicle.
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court were to do so by a process of reasoning, which to say the least
would be questionable, it would be exceeding its proper functions. 1'
Hayes v. Browet'0 represents another jurisdiction's approach to the
problem. It was appellant's contention that defendants could not
take advantage of the guest statute because their car was not being
lawfully operated on the public highway. The court answered this
objection, saying that the status of a guest becomes fixed at the
moment of entry into the automobile."'
The fourth jurisdiction to be confronted with this problem was
New York.22 However, New York does not have a guest statute,
and in this case the court was construing a Canadian guest statute.
The accident took place in Canada where the controlling Ontario
statute23 provided that the owner of a motor vehicle should be
liable for loss or damage sustained by others as a result of "the
operation of such motor vehicle on a highway." The defendant con-
tended that the statute precluded the plaintiff from maintaining an
action whether the negligence occurred on or off the highway. The
plaintiff framed his complaint so that he sought relief for only that
negligence which occurred on private property. The court did not
really deal with the problem, but rather directed the verdict for the
defendant, apparently24 on the theory that the negligent operation
3o 149 Ohio St. at 502, 37 Ohio OPS at 201, 79 N.E.2d at 908.
20 39 Wash. 2d 372, 235 P.2d 482.
21 Id. at 388-89, 235 P.2d at 492.
Appellants apparently argue that the status of one riding in an automobile
driven by another does not become fixed until the car is driven onto a public
highway, and that, if the car enters such a highway in an unlawful manner,
one who entered the car as a guest may no longer occupy that status, and this
without regard to whether the previous arrangement for the ride and the
unlawful act were anywise related.
If such a principle were adopted, an invited guest entering a car standing
on a private driveway or in a garage might well lose that status, if the car,
when it entered upon a public highway, should be mechanically defective
or even if it should be unlicensed.
Id.
22 260 App. Div. 982, 23 N.Y.S.2d at 598, citing ONTARIO REV. STATS. ch. 288
(1937).
23 ONTARIO REV. STATS. ch. 288 (1937), which provides:
(1) The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for loss or damage
sustained by any person by reason of negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle on a highway unless such motor vehicle was without the owner's
consent in the possession of some person other than the owner or his
chauffeur, and the driver of a motor vehicle not being the owner shall be
liable to the same extent as such owner.
(2) Nothwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1, the owner or driver
of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying
passengers for compensation, shall not be liable for any loss or damage re-
sulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in,
or upon, or entering or getting on to, or alighting from such motor vehicle.
24 260 App. Div. 982, 23 N.Y.S.2d 596. One can only assume the reason upon
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of the vehicle on the public highway was the proximate cause of
the entire injury.
Discernible in the cases of jurisdictions which have dealt with the
application of their guest statutes, are two general policy considera-
tions over which the courts are split.
The majority2 view is that the ultimate purpose of the guest
statutes is to lower the standard of care that is owed by the driver
of an automobile to his guest.26 These courts abide by the principle
that it would be inconsistent with the essence of the statute itself
to construe it strictly and, therefore interpret the statute liberally.
If these courts remain consistent, they will necessarily interpret their
state's guest statute as encompassing accidents which occur on private
as well as public roadways.
A small minority of jurisdictions,27 however, recognize that the
guest statutes are in derogation of the common law and, therefore,
that they should be strictly construed and sharply limited in their
operation.28 The states that have announced their adherence to this
strict statutory interpretation have strongly articulated their support.
Thus there would seem to be little chance that they would depart
from this doctrine.
When the California Legislature intends to make its motor vehicle
laws apply to private property in a certain circumstance, it will say so
in dear and precise language. 29 Until such time as the legislature sees
which the court based its decision, since the report only states the holding in two short
sentences.
25 These jurisdictions apparently include: Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington
and Wyoming.
26 W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 34 (3d ed. 1964).
They [automobile guest statutes] provide that the driver of an automobile
is liable to one who is riding as his gratuitous guest in his car only for some
form of aggravated misconduct . . . .The required form of aggravation is
specified as "gross negligence," "intentional," "wanton," or reckless miscon-
duct, acting "in disregard to the safety of others," "intoxication," or some
combination of the two or more.
27 These jurisdictions apparently include: Arkansas, California, Delaware and
Michigan.
28 Whittecar v. Cheatha, 226 Ark. 31, 33, 287 S.W.2d 578, 579 (1956), Prager v.
Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d at 93, 98 P.2d at 731. "The common law right of having redress
for injuries wrongfully inflicted, being lessened by such statutes, necessitates strict
construction, and also that cases be not held within the provisions of such statutes
unless it clearly appears that it should be so determined." Accord, Colombo v. Sech,
52 Del. 575, 577, 163 A.2d 270, 272 (1960); Piscopo v. Fruciano, 307 Mich. 433,
436, 12 N.W.2d 329, 330 (1943).
29 People v. Stansberry, 242 Cal. App. 2d 199, 202, 51 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1966).
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fit to amend the guest statute of this state, the principle case repre-
sents present California law, and the decision is consistent with the
California policy of strict interpretation of statutes in derogation of
the common law.
R. ZAIDEN CORRADo
It must be presumed that every word employed in a statute was intended
to have some meaning and to perform some useful office .... In Section
20002 the Legislature has not specifically enumerated particular places or
classes of places followed by the general word "elsewhere." Rather, by the
use of one compendious word-"highways"-followed by the words "and
elsewhere," it is our opinion that the latter words mean elsewhere than on
highways as defined by the Vehicle Code.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
